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*P.L. 392 The Localism Act 2011 (LA 2011) makes fundamental changes to the powers and
arrangements of local authorities.1 Amongst these is the introduction of a general power of
competence replacing the well-being power, in the Local Government Act 2000 (LGA 2000). This
analysis explores the nature of this new power and the extent to which it serves local authorities more
effectively than its predecessor. Whilst we focus chiefly on the wording of the relevant provisions and
the manner in which they have been interpreted, this analysis acknowledges that wider issues, not for
discussion here, have and can impact on the use of these powers.2
The LGA 2000 provided, at s.2(1), that every local authority3 had the power to do anything which it
considered likely to achieve the promotion or improvement of the economic, social and environmental
well-being of the local area.4 The provision was welcomed as providing "councils with an important
opportunity to develop a meaningful and substantive community leadership role".5 It is, at first glance,
a broad power allowing scope for local authorities to act as they choose, so long as it is for the benefit
of their local area. Indeed, following the occasion *P.L. 393 of the power’s first outing in the courts,
Arden noted that "the scope of the provision is … wide",6 a view that was echoed by others.7 In R. (on
the application of J (Ghanaian Citizen))v Enfield LBC,8 for example, Elias J. held that s.2 was
"capable of extending to the grant of financial assistance for acquiring accommodation".9
A loss of confidence?
Despite the breadth of the well-being power, the judgment in Brent LBC v Risk Management Partners
10 amounted to a significant limitation of local authorities’ capabilities under that power. Moore-Bick
L.J. held in the Court of Appeal that saving money (via participation in an insurance mutual) and
distribution of the savings to provide community services was beyond the well-being power, as it
might mean that a local authority could "lawfully embark on any scheme that [might] … reduce its
costs".11 Indeed, Layard notes the extent to which the Brent judgment "significantly undermined" the
credibility of the well-being power, limiting as it did, "further innovation" by local authorities12; whilst
Dobson goes so far as to suggest that local authorities experienced a "massive loss of confidence" as
a result of the judgment.13
Such a "loss of confidence" can have profound consequences for a local authority and might, in
certain instances, cause them to act too cautiously in seeking to promote the well-being of a particular
area and in contributing to the wider strength of local democracy. Dobson goes on to recount a Local
Government Association meeting that took place in the aftermath of Brent at which it was suggested
that:
"There is a pressing need … for local government to be given a general power of competence … All
local and regional partnerships will demand—and benefit from—the greater clarity and certainty of
powers that would flow from a general power of competence and help local governance to be fit for
purpose for the 21st century. *P.L. 394 " 14
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Well-being and sustainable development
Problems with the well-being power though are not restricted to issues of confidence. The language
of LGA 2000 s.2 is consistent with wider policies relating to sustainable development, noting as it
does the promotion of economic, social and environmental development as supporting any
justification for exercise of that power.15 As Jenkins notes, "it was the Government’s intention to
introduce a statutory duty for local authorities to contribute to the achievement of sustainable
development",16 and to ensure that they gave due regard to Sustainable Community Strategies in
exercising the well-being power.17 Jenkins goes on to cite the 1998 White Paper, Modern Local
Government: In Touch with the People in outlining that:
"This … duty will … enshrine in law the role of the council as the elected leader of their local
community with a responsibility for the well-being and ‘sustainable development’ of its area … It will
put ‘sustainable development’ at the heart of council decision-making and will provide an overall
framework within which councils must perform all their existing functions. So in taking decisions …
councils will have to weigh the likely effects of a decision against three objectives—economic, social
and environmental—and if necessary strike a balance to ensure the overall well-being of their area is
achieved." 18
Whilst notable and useful this perhaps had the effect of limiting the scope of an authority’s use of the
s.2 power and ensured that centralised authority retained a guiding role in how the well-being power
was used. Sustainable development is an important part of local authority autonomy, as Jenkins
illustrates.19 If local authorities were to be empowered to "develop … meaningful and substantive
community leadership role[s]",20 however, then surely such a power should have been more broadly
drafted. The wording served to limit the use of the power within certain fields, not to serve as a catch
all, blanket power as was seemingly intended at the outset.
Repeal of the well-being power
It is perhaps of no surprise, therefore, that the LA 2011 moved to repeal LGA 2000 s.2 and the
well-being power contained therein.21 It is replaced, in s.1(1) of the 2011 Act by a general power of
competence, discussed further below. It is notable, *P.L. 395 however, that whilst LGA 2000 s.2 was
repealed, the LA 2011 did not touch Local Government Act 1972 s.111(1) which provides for a local
authority to do "anything" which is "calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the
discharge of any of their functions"; or Greater London Authority Act 1999 s.30(1) which empowers
the Greater London Authority to do anything which it considers will further the promotion of economic
and social development, wealth creation and environmental improvement across London.
Whilst Local Government Act 1972 s.111(1) does not contain a standalone power but one that can
only be operated after the "prior identification of the function to which the acts in issue are incidental"22
; Greater London Authority Act 1999 s.30 has no such limitation and, indeed, its wording echoes that
of s.2 LGA 2000 in its emphasis on issues relating to sustainable development. Given both the
tendency of the courts strictly to police authorities’ use of the well-being power and the nature of its
inherent limitation to areas relating to sustainable development, it is puzzling that Parliament saw fit to
retain this power. Regardless; it is not for this article to delve into reasons why Parliament has sought
to repeal certain provisions over others, but rather to explore the nature of the LA 2011 ’s introduction
of a general power of competence.
The general power of competence
The LA 2011 is "a complex piece of legislation",23 introducing changes across a range of local issues.
The general power of competence, contained within s.1(1), enables a local authority24 to do "anything
an individual may do", allowing it to be done anywhere in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, for a
commercial purpose, with or without a charge, or for the benefit of the authority, its area or persons
resident or present in its area, or otherwise. The Explanatory Notes to the Act, emphasizing the
breadth and innovation underlying the new power, explain that it "may be used in innovative ways,
that is, in doing things that are unlike anything that a local authority—or any other public body—has
done before, or may currently do".25
The LA 2011 restricts the general power, laying down a number of "boundaries", which essentially
equate to five express inhibitions:
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•First, under s.2(1), the power cannot be used to circumvent restrictions on a
pre-existing power.
•
Secondly, under s.2(2), the power cannot be used to avoid an express statutory
restriction or one that is subsequently imposed by the Secretary of State.
•
Thirdly, s.2(3) the power may not be used to alter the prescribed form of a local
authority’s constitutional and governance arrangements, the discharge of its functions,
or contracting-out. *P.L. 396
•
Fourthly, under s.3, the power cannot be used to impose a charge for a service if it
does not meet prescribed requirements set out in s.3(2). Further, s.3(3) provides that
the local authority cannot make a profit through the general power.
•
Finally, (under s.4), the power may only be used for a "commercial purpose" if the
power would also permit its use for a "non-commercial purpose".
"Anything an individual may do"
The general power of competence is more widely drafted than the well-being power that it replaces.
Indeed, the wording of the provision demonstrates this breadth, not seeking to limit local authorities to
issues concerning sustainable development or ensuring action within set centralised boundaries, but
instead facilitating greater freedom and local autonomy. As Layard notes:
"this general power of competence … represents [a] … change in presumption. Local authorities are
to consider themselves free to act, unless it is proven otherwise." 26
The general power will, in effect, empower local authorities to exercise a species of residual power
enjoyed by ministers on behalf of the Crown. Citing the advice of Parliamentary Counsel, Sir Granville
Ram,27 Carnwath L.J. held in Shrewsbury & Atcham BC v the Secretary of State for Communities and
Local Government 28 that:
"The existence of a residual category of Ministerial power, not dependent on either statute or
prerogative, is a matter of continuing academic controversy. One aspect is the so-called ‘Ram
doctrine’, which has been interpreted as enabling Ministers, as representatives of the Crown, to do
anything that a natural person may do except if prohibited by statute".29
The position is best articulated by Wade, who was cited with approval by Lord Bridge in R. v Tower
Hamlets LBC Ex p. Chetnik Developments Ltd.30 Wade there explains the breadth of an individual’s
powers, describing it as "unfettered discretion".31 Whilst he there stresses that equally broad powers
would be "wholly inappropriate to a public authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it
may use them for the public good",32 the argument here is that the wording of the s.1(1) general
power and its emphasis on empowering local authorities to do "anything an individual may do" is such
as to afford local authorities the unfettered *P.L. 397 discretion enjoyed by individual persons,
although with a series of limitations as this paper goes on to discuss.
Unfettered discretion?
The drafting of the Act might appear to oust implicitly the supervisory jurisdiction of the Administrative
Court which, in turn, would leave significant power unchecked and unbalanced. The courts, however,
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are highly suspicious of such wide powers and have, latterly, been quick to impose implied
restrictions.33 In R. v Secretary of State for Health Ex p. C,34 for instance, the Court of Appeal
construed an obligation upon the Department of Health and specifically, upon the Secretary of State
as the accountable person, not to act unfairly or manifestly unreasonably when placing a social
worker on a list of persons unsuitable to work with children. Hale L.J. (as she then was) concluded
that discretion brought with it a "duty to act fairly in all the circumstances" notwithstanding the
Department’s power to act as an individual, as unfair or as unreasonable as that individual may be.35
In Shropshire, Carnwath L.J. attempted to stretch Hale L.J.’s consideration of reasonableness to an
obligation to act in the public benefit thus:
"As a matter of capacity, no doubt, it has power to do whatever a private person can do. But as an
organ of government, it can only exercise those powers for the public benefit, and for identifiably
‘governmental’ purposes within limits set by the law." 36
According to Richards L.J. however, the inhibition conceived by Carnwath L.J. would serve "… no
practical utility or would risk imposing an artificial and inappropriate restriction upon the work of
government".37 The question in construing the general power of competence in the LA 2011 is, what
limits, if any at all, exist on its use, beyond those identified in the Act.
First, there was no suggestion during the passage of the Bill that the general power would not be
subject to control of the courts. Indeed, the Equality Impact Assessment published to accompany the
Bill identifies a number of particular legal constraints.38 Chiefly, it confirms that exercise of the general
power is intended to be subject to judicial review, although it suggests the standard of review may be
*P.L. 398 the high one of "[un]reasonableness".39 It goes on to identify the comprehensive regime of
controls of local government expenditure as another separate constraint.40
Secondly, whilst the judgment in Brent was somewhat at odds with the then settled jurisprudence that
the well-being power should be construed in wide terms,41 the words of Pill L.J. are notable in
underlining the court’s unwillingness to interpret LGA 2000 s.2 too broadly. He said:
"I do not consider Parliament was giving a carte blanche to make arrangements, subject only to
section 3 of the 2000 Act and to the identification of some advantage, or potential advantage, to the
local authority’s financial position." 42
This, in effect, reserved to the courts a broader supervisory power beyond the words of statute.
Indeed, this was further evident in Gibb v Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust 43 where Treacy
J. held an overly generous compromise agreement ultra vires, only for the decision later to be
reversed by the Court of Appeal with Sedley L.J. criticising the trial judge for acting as an auditor
rather than a judge.44 At the very least, the bands of rationality must still surely apply in respect of the
operation of the general power and, therefore, manifestly risky schemes would still be liable to be
quashed.
Thirdly, there has been a consistent reluctance to permit local authorities to engage in commercial
activities. This appears to be based on an underlying concern to protect public funds from undue risk
and that the money used is raised via mandatory taxation, rather than trade, where customers would
have some discretion whether to invest or not in a given scheme. Indeed, the power, contained in LA
2011 s.1, to engage in activities for "commercial purposes" can only be used if they are activities
which the authority may, in exercise of the general power of competence, do otherwise than for a
commercial purpose. The question was addressed by the House of Lords in Hazell v Hammersmith
and Fulham LBC 45 against the context of Local Government Act 1972 s.111(1). In Hazell, Lord
Templeman stated that:
"Individual trading corporations and others may speculate as much as they please or consider
prudent. But a local authority is not a trading or currency or commercial operator with no limit on the
method or extent of its borrowing or with powers to speculate. The local authority is a public authority
dealing with public moneys …" 46
The position was followed by the Court of Appeal in Credit Suisse v Waltham Forest LBC 47 where
Hobhouse L.J. held that the indemnity offered by the Council *P.L. 399 to a private company
amounted to "an [unlawful] exercise in property speculation on borrowed money".48 Indeed, both Pill
and Moore-Bick LL.J.’s judgments in Brent reveal a fundamentally cautious approach by the courts
when it comes to local authority commercial activity. This was plainly in evidence in R. (on the
application of Sainsbury’s Supermarkets) v Wolverhampton CC,49 which concerned the operation of a
Council’s powers of compulsory purchase under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s.227. In
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resolving whether and how to use its powers in relation to a major site in Wolverhampton, the Council
took account of one party’s offer to regenerate a separate site. The majority found the Council’s
approach to be unlawful. Lord Walker, in giving reasons for his decision to quash the compulsory
purchase order, held obiter that:
"The public purse is to be protected against improvidence, but the local authority should not be
exercising its power in order to make a commercial profit." 50
The wording of LA 2011 s.4(1) appears to give enough room for this argument still to apply in respect
of future litigation, notwithstanding the presence of a general power of competence which explicitly
provides for indulgence in activities for "commercial purposes". A purely "commercial" scheme with no
conceivable non-commercial application therefore would be beyond the s.1 power.
Fourthly, s.2(2) of the Act seeks to limit the scope of the general power to the extent that an authority
cannot do anything which it is unable to do by virtue of statute. Though, as Layard notes, "local
authorities are free to act unless specifically restrained",51 the purpose of this provision is to prevent
use of the general power to justify otherwise unlawful action. In Manydown Co Ltd v Basingstoke and
Deane BC,52 for example, and with regards to pre-commencement provisions, Lindbolm J. noted that
"[The general power of competence] is not available to rescue an authority from the consequences of
unlawful actions taken before it came into effect. And in my judgment it would not be right for this new
power to be relied upon to justify an authority’s use or management of land inconsistently with the
statutory purpose for which that land was acquired." 53
Furthermore, and with specific regard to post commencement provisions, writing prior to the LA 2011
’s enactment, Leigh considers that the
"thorny question of restrictions imposed in legislation coming after the enactment of the general
competence power is dealt with by a provision that *P.L. 400 seems to require an express
parliamentary statement of intention to override the general power." 54
Section 5(1) of the Act provides that the Secretary of State can "order, amend, repeal, revoke or
disapply" a provision which "prevents or restricts local authorities from exercising the general power".
It continues, at s.5(2), to give the Secretary of State the power to "order, amend, repeal, revoke or
disapply" an incoming provision where that provision overlaps with the general power. These
provisions give the Secretary of State the opportunity to prioritise the general power of competence
over any subsequent and conflicting statutory provisions. As Leigh continues, the result is that the
general power is constitutionally significant, equating to a "de facto suspension of the implied repeal
rule".55
The question of "overlap" with pre-commencement provisions, in LA 2011 s.2(1), however, is perhaps
a more difficult one for local authorities and potentially the field of most future litigation. Unless the
scheme proposed by the authority is outlandish, it is highly likely the authority will possess existing
powers, albeit which are subject to some statutory limitations. If, for example, an authority sought to
acquire a land interest by agreement it might seek to use the general power rather than that
contained within Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s.227(1), as a means of avoiding the necessity
to demonstrate connected well-being benefits under s.226(1A) and so merely acquire land to produce
an income stream for itself. The overlap restriction at s.2(1) would apply as an inhibition on the use of
the general power to prevent such an interpretation. It is far from straightforward however where
several potential pre-commencement powers might overlap to determine which is the proper fetter on
the general power of competence.
Alternatively, it could be that the practice is one so mundane that it does not attract a statutory
inhibition at all. In R. (on the application of National Secular Society and Bone) v Bideford Town
Council,56 for example, the practice of including prayers on the Authority’s agenda was not within the
scope of s.111 of the 1972 Act. The Secretary of State, however, was swift to point-out that the new
general power of competence would enable this practice to continue as it was not otherwise
prohibited by law.57
Troubles with a limitless power
As demonstrated, the general power of competence should be open to judicial review. Local
authorities’ discretion is so potentially wide it quite possibly requires the threat of a quashing order to
temper manifest abuses of power, with the courts retaining the final obligation to interpret statutory
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powers and to consider the extent to which they have been lawfully exercised. Aside from the obvious
breaches of good administration which would attract review, however, a decision not to exercise the
power might well attract the same legal flack as a misconceived operation, as *P.L. 401 indeed has
been the focus of many of the cases around LGA 2000 s.2(1). The most helpful guidance has been
provided by Sedley L.J. in R. (on the application of Morris) v Westminster City Council 58:
"The local authority (a) is not obliged but (b) is permitted to use its alternative powers [under s.2 LGA
2000], so as long as (c) it does not exercise them with the object simply circumventing restrictions …"
59
The "discretion", then, is plain. There is no duty to exercise the s.2(1) powers as indeed there will be
no duty on the basis of current wording, to exercise the general power.
Conclusions on the general power
The policy behind this flagship part of the 2011 Act, therefore, appears to be an attempt to return to a
simpler and more flexible, post-war local government framework. As Loughlin explains of the
pre-1980s era of local government administration:
"while the procedures through which administrative decisions were made were often the subject of
statutory regulation, the law did not attempt normative regulation of the objectives of these systems."
60
The Coalition’s "Localism Agenda", however, (of which the general power is a key plank) appears to
alter little about the framework of governmental administration, instead making relatively minor
alterations to the levels of government at which decisions are taken. The Act does little, for example,
to dismantle what Loughlin categorises as the increasing "juridification" of local government functions
from the 1980s.61 The legislative scheme retains strict limits on the exercise of the new discretionary
power at s.1(1) of the Act and rationalises control via legal rather than administrative norms.
The general power, however, does perhaps encourage a system based less on centralised control.
By repealing the requirement that the exercise of discretion be only to promote certain goals, such as
sustainable development, local authorities potentially have greater freedom to use the power for
broader purposes.
Whilst the superintendence of the general power by the Administrative Court will reveal whether the
legislative change has been sufficient to alter judicial reasoning in local government, the ultimate test
will be its relevance. It is not able to be deployed to cut through pre-existing regimes, and given that
almost every aspect of local government administration is already regulated by statute, the *P.L. 402
compass of uses for which the general power will be of assistance is necessarily rather narrow.
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